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Abstract: 
 
This note explores the signaling effect of foreign exchange market intervention in 
countries, such as Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, where separate 
agencies are responsible for intervention and monetary policy. An important part of the 
signaling effect operates when an entity conducting intervention makes a credible 
commitment to a change in future monetary policy, suggesting that its effectiveness 
hinges upon whether the central bank is independent of government oversight. We test 
this conjecture by comparing the consistency of intervention and future monetary policy 
in Japan before and after April 1998, when central bank independence was established by 
the new Bank of Japan Law. As expected, the signaling effect of intervention weakened 
after the central bank became independent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This note explores the signaling effect of foreign exchange market intervention, 
an important part of which operates when an entity conducting intervention makes a 
credible commitment to a change in future monetary policy. If separate agencies are 
responsible for intervention and monetary policy, as in Japan, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom or the United States, it is unclear if the government can credibly commit the 
central bank to change its future monetary policy. Thus, the validity of the monetary 
policy channel of signaling must hinge upon whether the central bank is independent of 
government oversight. We test this conjecture by comparing the consistency of 
intervention and future monetary policy in Japan before and after April 1998, when 
central bank independence was enshrined in the new Bank of Japan Law. 
The rest of this note proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the conceptual issues 
discussed in the literature concerning the signaling effect of foreign exchange market 
intervention. Section III tests the impact of central bank independence on the signaling 
effect of intervention in Japan, by postulating a simple probit model of the consistency of 
foreign exchange market intervention and future monetary policy during 1980-2004. 
Finally, section IV presents concluding remarks. 
II. THE SIGNALING EFFECT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The signaling effect is considered to be the principal channel through which 
intervention affects exchange rates. Under the normal operating procedure of 
contemporary central banks, any impact of intervention on the monetary base is sterilized 
in order to maintain the policy interest rate (or the monetary base) at a target level. With 
the direct monetary effect inoperative, intervention can affect exchange rates only 
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through the portfolio balance or the signaling effect, but empirical work finds only weak 
support for the portfolio channel (Edison 1993; Sarno and Taylor 2001; Vitale 2007). 
Studies of the signaling effect of US intervention in the late 1980s are mixed. 
While Lewis (1995) identifies Granger causality from intervention to future monetary 
policy, Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) and Klein and Rosengren (1991) report conflicting 
or negative findings (see also Fatum and Hutchison 1999 for the period 1989-93). For 
Swiss National Bank intervention, Payne and Vitale (2003), finding that only government 
trades, but not customer trades conducted by the central bank, affected the dollar 
exchange rate during 1986-95, conclude that the signaling effect is the only consistent 
explanation. 
For Japanese intervention, a large empirical literature has emerged since 2001 
when official daily intervention data began to be disclosed (retroactive to April 1991). 
Although studies utilizing different methodologies and samples have come to mixed 
conclusions about its effectiveness, most of them suggest that intervention was effective, 
at least during some part of the period (Table 1). Given the likely substitutability between 
dollar and yen assets, these studies appeal to the signaling effect to explain the impact of 
intervention. 
In Japan, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market by using a special account of the National Budget, with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
acting as its agent. When purchasing (selling) dollars, the MOF issues (redeems) 
financing bills (FBs), which are short-term government notes. Once issued, FBs are 
rolled over continuously as long as the underlying foreign assets are maintained as 
official reserves. Sale of the underlying foreign assets reduces the outstanding balance of 
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FBs to the extent that they are redeemed. Because FBs are sold to (or purchased from) the 
public at market rates, this arrangement ensures that intervention is sterilized.1
The signaling effect of intervention could conceivably involve several channels 
(e.g., the perception that the monetary authorities have superior information about the 
equilibrium exchange rate), we focus here on the monetary policy channel. We conjecture 
that, in a system where the government conducts foreign exchange intervention, the 
monetary policy channel of signaling presupposes government oversight over the central 
bank. In support of such a view, Watanabe (1994) shows that a fall (rise) in the discount 
rate and an increase (decrease) in the growth rate of money were consistently preceded by 
purchases (sales) of foreign exchange during a period before 1 April 1998, when the new 
Bank of Japan Law came into force. 
 
To be sure, even if the central bank were independent, it could still collaborate 
with the government. In Japan, an informal system of coordination may have existed 
during the period of quantitative easing (2001-06) when the policy objectives of the 
government and the central bank coincided (both wanted a weaker yen and an easier 
monetary policy), even though the central bank was formally independent. Likewise, in 
the United States, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve usually provide roughly equal 
amounts of funds when intervention takes place (FRB 2005). But collaboration cannot be 
a permanent feature of such a system, as separate agencies are bound to develop different 
objectives from time to time. Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) observe, for example, that a 
conflict with the US Treasury in the early 1990s led the Federal Reserve to quit 
intervening on its own account. It is thus worth exploring whether the establishment of 
                                                 
1 When FBs are issued for intervention purposes, they are initially purchased by the BOJ in their entirety. 
The BOJ will then unwind the position over time through weekly auctions. 
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central bank independence in 1998 changed the information content of intervention about 
future monetary policy in Japan. 
III. TESTING THE IMPACT OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE ON INTERVENTION 
SIGNALING 
In this section, we test the conjecture that the establishment of central bank 
independence in April 1998 weakened the consistency of intervention and future 
monetary policy in Japan, thereby diminishing the signaling effect of intervention. 
In particular, we estimate the following probit model: 
       
x = α0 + α1 IND + α2 SEL + α3 QE + u     (1) 
 
where x is a binary dependent variable that takes the value of 1 when the direction of 
intervention is consistent with the change in monetary policy over a 12-month horizon 
and zero otherwise; IND is a dummy variable for central bank independence (IND=1 
after April 1998 and zero otherwise); SEL is a dummy variable for yen-selling 
interventions; QE is a dummy variable for quantitative easing (QE=1 after March 2001 
and zero otherwise); α0 is a constant, αi  (i=1,3) is a coefficient to be estimated, and u is a 
random error term. The QE dummy is intended to capture the possible presence of 
informal collaboration between the government and the central bank. 
The consistency measure, x, is defined in relation to the operating target used by 
the Bank of Japan, namely: (i) the official discount rate through September 1994; (ii) the 
unsecured overnight call rate from October 1994 through February 2001; and (iii) under 
quantitative easing, the current account balances (or deposits held by commercial banks 
at the central bank), from March 2001 through the end of the sample period.  
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We have identified as an intervention month any month during which intervention 
took place. For the January 1980-March 1991 period, prior to the release of official data, 
we estimated monthly interventions from the corresponding changes in the end-of-month 
balance of foreign exchange reserves, adjusted for the estimated interest earnings 
obtained from multiplying the average balance by the US Treasury bill rate. We removed 
from the sample any estimated intervention smaller than 100 billion yen, lest we falsely 
ascribe a small change in the balance of foreign exchange reserves to intervention.2
Equation (1) was estimated for January 1980-March 2004, using (i) all 
intervention months and (ii) only those months during which the amount exceeded 400 
billion yen (Table 2). In both specifications, the coefficient of central bank independence 
is negative and significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that independence weakened 
the consistency of intervention and monetary policy over the coming year. The 
coefficient of quantitative easing is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, 
suggesting that the MOF and the BOJ may have had similar objectives during March 
2001-March 2004, irrespective of central bank independence. These results mean that, 
once adjusted for the impact of quantitative easing, the establishment of central bank 
independence in April 1998 diminished the signaling effect of intervention. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This note has made a preliminary exploration of the signaling effect of foreign 
exchange market intervention in Japan, where separate agencies are responsible for 
intervention and monetary policy. Testing the conjecture that the monetary policy 
channel of signaling in such an environment hinges upon government oversight over the 
                                                 
2 Monthly data on intervention were obtained from the Ministry of Finance (www.mof.go.jp). Except for 
the US Treasury bill rate (obtained from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics), all other data come from the Bank of Japan (www.boj.co.jp). 
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central bank, we have found that the consistency of intervention and future monetary 
policy in Japan indeed weakened after April 1998, when the new Bank of Japan Law 
established central bank independence. 
It should be stressed, however, that the results are only tentative. Most of the post- 
independence sample (April 1998-March 2004) coincides with the period of quantitative 
easing (March 2001-March 2004), so that the estimated impact of central bank 
independence during a “normal” period was based mainly on a rather small number of 
observations (35 months, from April 1998 to February 2001). Nor does the lack of 
signaling under central bank independence entirely refute the validity of the signaling 
effect defined more broadly, which could conceivably involve multiple channels. Even so, 
we can safely conclude that the signaling effect of intervention lost an important channel 
of influence in Japan when the central bank became independent. 
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Table 1: Selected Empirical Studies on the Effectiveness of Daily Japanese Intervention 
Using MOF Data 
Study Methodology Sample period/effectiveness 
1. Nagayasu 
(2004) 
Time-series/ 
GARCH 
April 1991-September 2001 
Unilateral Coordinated 
No Yes, but short-lived 
2. Chaboud and 
Humpage 
(2005) 
Forecast value (if 
success 
frequency 
exceeds random 
occurrence) 
April 1991-June 
1995 
June 1995-
December 2002 
January 2003- 
March 2004 
Limited Limited No 
3. Galati, 
Melick, and 
Micu (2005) 
Time-series September 1993-April 2000 
No 
4. Fatum and 
Hutchison 
(2006) 
Event study April 1991-March 2001 
Yes 
5. Kim and 
Sheen (2006) 
Exponential 
GARCH 
(simultaneous 
estimation of 
mean and 
variance) 
May 1991-June 1995 June 1995-March 2004 
No Yes 
6. Ito (2007) Time-series April 1991-June 
1995 
June 1995-
January 2003 
January 2003-
March 2004 
Yes, only if 
coordinated with 
the US 
Yes Yes 
7. Fatum and 
Hutchison 
(2010) 
Propensity score 
matching 
January 1999-
December 2002 
January-
December 2003 
January-March 
2004 
Yes No No 
Notes: Yes=intervention had effect in an intended direction; No=intervention had no or perverse 
effect. 
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Table 2: Estimating the Effect of Central Bank Independence on the Consistency of 
Intervention and Future Monetary Policy 
 All interventions Large interventions of more than 400 
billion yen only 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Prob. Coefficient Std. error Prob. 
Constant (α0) -0.649 0.207 0.002 0.086 0.407 0.832 
Central bank 
independence (α1) 
-0.892 0.432 0.039 -1.044 0.522 0.046 
Yen sales (α2) 1.245 0.287 0.000 0.576 0.500 0.247 
Quantitative 
easing (α3) 
1.482 0.555 0.008 1.568 0.591 0.008 
Diagnostic statistics: 
NOB 114 54 
Pseudo R2 0.205 0.144 
LR statistic 
(probability) 
32.21 (0.000) 9.69 (0.021) 
 
 
 
